Bootstrapping the Long Tail in Peer to Peer Systems by Huberman, Bernardo A. & Wu, Fang
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
51
20
33
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 8 
De
c 2
00
5
Bootstrapping the Long Tail in Peer to Peer
Systems
Bernardo A. Huberman and Fang Wu
HP Labs, Palo Alto, CA 94304
July 6, 2018
Abstract
We describe an efficient incentive mechanism for P2P systems that gen-
erates a wide diversity of content offerings while responding adaptively to
customer demand. Files are served and paid for through a parimutuel
market similar to that commonly used for betting in horse races. An
analysis of the performance of such a system shows that there exists an
equilibrium with a long tail in the distribution of content offerings, which
guarantees the real time provision of any content regardless of its popu-
larity.
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1 Introduction
The provision of digitized content on-demand to millions of users presents a
formidable challenge. With an ever increasing number of fixed and mobile de-
vices with video capabilities, and a growing consumer base with different pref-
erences, there is a need for a scalable and adaptive way of delivering a diverse
set of files in real time to a worldwide consumer base.
Providing such varied content presents two problems. First, files should
be accessible in such a way that the constraints posed by bandwidth and the
diversity of demand is met without having to resort to client server architectures
and specialized network protocols. Second, as new content is created, the system
ought to be able to swiftly respond to new demand on specific content, regardless
of its popularity. This is a hard constraint on any distributed system, since
providers with a finite amount of memory and bandwidth will tend to offer the
most popular content, as is the case today with many peer-to-peer systems.
The first problem is naturally solved by peer to peer networks, where each
peer can be both a consumer and provider of the service. Peer to peer net-
works, unlike client server architectures, automatically scale in size as demand
fluctuates, as well as being able to adapt to system failures. Examples of such
systems are Bittorrent [4] and Kazaa, who account for a sizable percentage
of all the use of the Internet. Furthermore, new services like the BBC IMP,
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/imp/) show that it is possible to make media content
available through a peer-to-peer system while respecting digital rights.
It is the second problem, that of an adaptable and efficient system capable
of delivering any file, regardless of its popularity, that we now solve. We do so
by creating an implementable incentive mechanism that ensures the existence
of a diverse set of offerings which is in equilibrium with the available supply and
demand, regardless of content and size. Moreover, the mechanism is such that
it automatically generates the long tail of offerings which has been shown to be
responsible for the success of a number of online businesses such as Amazon or
eBay [2]. In other words, while the system delivers favorite mainstream content,
it can also provide files that constitute small niche markets which only in the
aggregate can generate large revenues.
In what follows we describe an efficient incentive mechanism for P2P systems
that generates a wide diversity of content offerings while responding adaptively
to customer demand. Files are served and paid for through a parimutuel mar-
ket similar to that commonly used for betting in horse races. An analysis of
the performance of such a system shows that there exists an equilibrium with a
long tail in the distribution of content offerings, which guarantees the real time
provision of any content regardless of its popularity. In our case, the bandwidth
fraction of a given file offered by a server plays the role of the odds, the band-
width consumed corresponds to bettors, the files to horses, and the requests are
analogous to races.
An interesting consequence of this mechanism is that it solves in complete
fashion the free riding problem that originally plagued P2P systems like Gnutella
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[1] and that in milder forms still appears in other such systems. The reason being
that it transforms the provision of content from a public good into a private one.
We then analyze the performance of such a system by making a set of as-
sumptions that are first restrictive and are then relaxed so as to make them
correspond to a realistic crowd of users. We show that in all these cases there
exists an equilibrium in which the demand for any file can be fulfilled by the
system. Moreover this equilibrium exhibits a robust empirical anomaly which
is responsible for generating a very long tail in the distribution of content of-
ferings. We finally discuss the scenario where most of the servers are bounded
rational and show that it is still possible to achieve an optimum equilibrium.
We conclude by summarizing our results and discussing the feasibility of its
implementation.
2 The system and its incentive mechanism
Consider a network-based file exchange system consisting of three types of
traders: content provider, server, and downloader or user. A content provider
supplies—at a fixed price per file—a repertoire of files to a number of people
acting as peers or servers. Servers then selectively serve a subset of those files
to downloaders for a given price. In a peer-to-peer system a downloader can
also, and often does, act as a server.
If the files are typically large in size, a server can only afford to store and
serve a relatively small subset of files. It then faces the natural problem of
choosing an optimal (from the point of view of maximizing his utility) subset of
files to store so as to sell them to downloaders.
Suppose that the system charges each downloader a flat fee for downloading
any one file (as in Apple’s iTunes music store), which we normalize to one.
Since many servers can help distribute a single file, this unit of income has to
be allocated to the servers in ways that will incentivize them to always respond
to a changing demand.
In order to do so, consider the case where there are m servers and n files.
Let bij be the effective bandwidth of server i serving file j, normalized to∑
i,j
bij = 1. (1)
Also, denote the bandwidth fraction of file j by
pij =
∑
k
bkj . (2)
Suppose that when a downloader connects to the system, it starts download-
ing different parts of the file simultaneously from all available servers that have
it. When it finishes downloading, it will have received a fraction of the file j
qij =
bij∑
k bkj
=
bij
pij
(3)
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from server i. Our mechanism prescribes that the system should should pay an
amount qij to server i as its reward for serving file j.
Now consider the case when server i’s reserves an amount of bandwidth bij
as his “bid” on file j. Because we have normalized the total bandwidth and
the total reward for serving one request both to one, the proportional share
allocation scheme described by Eq. (3) can be interpreted as redistributing the
total bid to the “winners”, in proportion to their bids. Thus our payoff structure
is similar to that of a pari-mutuel horse race betting market, where the pij can be
regarded as the odds, the bandwidth corresponds to bettors, the files to horses,
and the requests are analogous to races. It is worth pointing out however, that
in a real horse race all players who have placed a bet on the winning horse
receive a share of the total prize, whereas in our system only those players that
kept the ”winning” file and also had a chance to serve it get paid. In spite of this
difference it is easy to show that when rewritten in terms of expected payoffs,
the two mechanisms behave in similar fashion.
3 The solution
3.1 Rational servers with static strategies and known
download rates
In this section we make three simplifying assumptions. While not realistic they
serve to set the framework that we will utilize later on to deal with more realistic
scenarios. First, every server is rational in the sense that he chooses the optimal
bandwidth allocation that maximizes his utility, whose explicit form will be
given below. Second, every server’s allocation strategy is static, i.e. the bij ’s are
independent of time. Third, we assume that each file j is requested randomly
at a rate λj > 0 that does not change with time, and these rates are known to
every server.
Consider a server i with the following standard additive form of utility:
U = E
[∫
∞
0
e−δtu(t)dt
]
, (4)
where u(t) is his income density at time t, and δ > 0 is his future discount factor.
Let Xj1 be the (random) time that file j is requested for the first time, let Xj2
be the time elapsed between the first request and the second request, and so
on. According to our parimutuel reward scheme, server i receives a lump-sum
reward bij/pij from every such request, at times Xj1, Xj1 +Xj2, etc. Thus, the
server i’s total utility is given by
U =
∑
j
bij
pij
∞∑
l=1
E[e−δ
∑ l
k=1
Xjk ] ≡
∑
j
bij
pij
uj . (5)
The sum of expectations in Eq. (5) (denoted by uj) can be calculated explicitly.
Because the Xjk’s are i.i.d. random variables with density λ
−1
j exp(λjx), we
4
have
uj = E[e
−δXj1 ]
(
1 +
∞∑
l=2
E[e−δ
∑ l
k=2
Xjk ]
)
=
λj
λj + δ
(1 + uj). (6)
Solving for uj, we then find
uj =
λj
δ
. (7)
If we let λ =
∑
j λj be the total request rate and pj = λj/λ be the probability
that the next request asks for file j, then we can also write
uj =
λ
δ
pj. (8)
Plugging this back into Eq. (5), we obtain
U =
λ
δ
∑
j
pjbij
pij
. (9)
Since we assume that server i is rational, he will allocate bij in a way that
it solves the following optimization problem:
max
(bij)nj=1∈R
n
+
∑
j
pjbij∑
k bkj
subject to
∑
j
bij ≤ bi. (10)
Thus we see that the servers are playing a finite budget resource allocation
game. This type of game has been studied intensively, and a Nash equilibrium
has been shown to exist under mild assumptions [6, 9]. In such an equilibrium,
the players’ utility functions are strongly competitive and in spite of a possibly
large utility gap, the players behave in almost envy-free fashion, i.e. each player
believes that that no other player has received more than they have.
3.2 Rational servers with static strategies and unknown
request rates
We now relax some of the assumptions made above so as to deal with a more
realistic case.
It is usually hard to find out the accurate request rate for a given file, es-
pecially at the early stages when there is no historical data available. Thus it
makes more sense to assume that every server i holds a subjective belief about
those request rates. Let pij be server i’s subjective probability that the next
request is for file j. Then server i believes that file j will be requested at a rate
λij = λpij . Eq. (10) then becomes
max
(bij)nj=1∈R
n
+
∑
j
pijbij∑
k bkj
subject to
∑
j
bij ≤ bi. (11)
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which is still a finite budget resource allocation game as considered in the pre-
vious section.
It is interesting to note that when m is large, bij is small compared to pij =∑
k bkj , so that pij can be treated as a constant. In this case, the optimization
problem can be well approximated by
max
(bij)nj=1∈R
n
+
∑
j
pijbij
pij
subject to
∑
j
bij ≤ bi. (12)
Thus, user i should use all his bandwidth to serve those files j with the largest
ratio pij/pij.
This scenario (12) corresponds to the so-called parimutuel consensus prob-
lem, which has been studied in detail. In this problem a certain probability
space is observed by a number of individuals, each of which endows it with their
own subjective probability distributions. The issue then is how to aggregate
those subjective probabilities in such a way that they represent a good consen-
sus of the individual ones. The parimutuel consensus scheme is similar to that
of betting on horses at a race, the final odds on a given horse being propor-
tional to the amount bet on the horse. As shown by Eisenberg and Gale [5], an
equilibrium then exists such that the bettors as a group maximize the weighted
sum of logarithms of subjective expectations, with the weights being the total
bet on each horse.
Moreover a number of empirical studies of parimutuel markets [7] have
shown that they do indeed exhibit a high correlation between the subjective
probabilities of the bettors and the objective probabilities generated by the
racetracks. Equally interesting for our purposes is the existence of a robust em-
pirical anomaly called the favorite-longshot bias [7]. The anomaly shows that
favorites win more frequently than the subjectives probabilities imply, and long-
shots less often. Besides implying that favorites are better bets than long shots,
this anomaly ensures the existence of the long tail, populated by those files
which while not singly popular, in aggregate are responsible for a large amount
of the traffic in the system.
3.3 Rational servers with a dynamic strategy
We now consider the case where the rate at which files are requested can change
with time. Because of this, each server has to actively adjust its bandwidth
allocation to adapt to such changes. As we have seen in the last section, user i
has an incentive to serve those files with large values of pij/pij . Recall that pij(t)
is just the fraction of total bandwidth spent to serve file j at time t, which in
principle can be estimated from the system’s statistics. Thus it would be useful
to have the system frequently broadcast the real-time pij to all servers so as to
help them decide on how to adjust their own allocations of bandwidth.
From Eq. (3) we see that, by serving file j, user i’s expected per bandwidth
earning from the next request is
pjqij
bij
=
pj
pij
. (13)
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Hence a user will benefit most by serving those files with the largest “p/pi ratio”.
However, as soon as a given user starts serving file j, the corresponding p/pi ratio
decreases. As a consequence, the system self-adapts to the limit of uniform p/pi
ratios. If the system is perfectly efficient, we would expect that
pj
pij
= constant. (14)
Because pj and pij both sum up to one, this implies that
pij = pj , (15)
or ∑
k
bkj =
λj
λ
∝ λj . (16)
In other words, the total bandwidth used to serve a file is proportional to the
file’s request rate.
This result has interesting implications when considering the social utility
of the downloaders. Recently, Tewari and Kleinrock [8] have shown that in a
homogeneous network the average download time is minimized when
∑
k bkj ∝
λj . This implies that in the perfectly efficient limit, our mechanism maximizes
the downloaders’ social utility, which is measured by their average download
times.
Since in reality a market is never perfectly efficient, the above analysis only
makes sense if the characteristic time it takes for the system to relax back to
uniformity from any disturbance is short. As a concrete example, consider a new
file j released at time 0, being shared by only one server. Suppose that every
downloader starts sharing her piece of the file immediately after downloading it.
Because there are few servers serving the file but many downloaders requesting
the file, for very short times afterwards the upload bandwidth will be fully
utilized. That is, during time dt, an amount pij(t)dt of data is downloaded and
added to the total upload bandwidth immediately. Hence we have
dpij(t) = pij(t)dt. (17)
which implies that pij(t) grows exponentially until pij(T ) ∼ pj . Solving for T ,
we find
T ∼ log
(
pj
pij(0)
)
. (18)
Thus the system reaches uniformity in logarithmic time, a signature of its high
efficiency.
3.4 Servers with bounded rationality
So far we have assumed that all servers are rational, so that they will actively
seek those files that are most under-supplied so as to serve them to downloaders.
In reality however, while some servers do behave rationally, a lot others do not.
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This is because even a perfectly rational server sometimes can make wrong
decisions as to which files to store because his subjective probability estimate
of what is in demand can be inaccurate. Also, such a bounded-rational server
can at times be too lazy to adjust his bandwidth allocation, so that he will
keep serving whatever he has, and at other times he might simply imitate other
servers’ behavior by choosing to serve the popular files. In all these cases we need
to consider whether or not the lack of full rationality will lead to equilibrium
on the part of the system.
As a simple example, assume there are only two files, A and B. Let p =
λA/λ be file A’s real request probability, and let 1 − p be file B’s real request
probability. Suppose the servers are divided into two classes, with α fraction
rational and 1 − α fraction irrational, arriving one by one in a random order.
Each rational server’s subjective probability in general can be described by an
identically distributed random variable Pt ∈ [0, 1] with mean p. Then with
probability P[Pt > pi(t)] he will serve file A, and with probability P[Pt < pi(t)]
he will serve file B. In order to carry out some explicit calculation below, we
consider the simplest choice of Pt, namely a Bernoulli variable
P[Pt = 1] = p, P[Pt = 0] = 1− p. (19)
(Clearly E[Pt] = p, so the subjective probabilities are accurate on average.) It is
easy to check that under this choice a rational server chooses A with probability
p and B with probability 1− p.
On the other hand, consider the situation where an irrational server chooses
an existing server at random and copies that server’s bandwidth allocation.
That is, with probability pi(t) an irrational server will choose file A.1
From these two assumptions we see that
P[server t serves A] = αp+ (1 − α)pi(t), (20)
and
P[server t serves B] = α(1 − p) + (1− α)(1 − pi(t)). (21)
The stochastic process described by the above two equations has been re-
cently studied in the context of choices among technologies for which evidence
of their value is equivocal, inconclusive, or even nonexistent [3]. As was shown
there, the dynamics generated by such equations leads to outcomes that appear
to be deterministic in spite of being governed by a stochastic process. In the
context of our problem this means that when the objective evidence for the
choice of a particular file is very weak, any sample path of this process quickly
settles down to a fraction of files downloaded that is not predetermined by the
initial conditions: ex ante, every outcome is just as (un)likely as every other.
Thus one cannot ensure an equilibrium that is both optimum and repeatable.
1This assumption can also be interpreted as follows. Suppose a downloader starts serving
his files immediately after downloading, but never initiates to serve a file. (This is the way
a non-seed peer behaves within Bittorrent.) Then the probability that he will serve file j is
exactly the probability that he just downloaded file j, which is pij(t).
8
In the opposite case, when the objective evidence is strong, the process
settles down to a value that is determined by the quality of the evidence. In
both cases the proportion of files downloaded never settles into either zero or
one.
In the general case that we have been considered, there are always a number
of servers that will behave in bounded rational fashion and a few that are per-
fectly rational. Specifically, when α > 0, which corresponds to the case where
a small number of servers are rational, the pi(t) will converge to p in the long
time limit. That is, a small fraction of rational servers is enough for the system
to reach an optimum equilibrium. However, it is worth pointing out that since
the characteristic convergence time diverges exponentially in 1/α, the smaller
the value of alpha α, the longer it will take for the system to reach such an
optimum state.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we a peer-to-peer system with an incentive mechanism that gen-
erates diversity of offerings, efficiency and adaptability to customer demand.
This was accomplished by having a pricing structure for serving files that has
the structure of a parimutuel market, similar to those commonly used in horse
races, where the the bandwidth fraction of a given file offered by a server plays
the role of the odds, the bandwidth corresponds to bettors, the files to horses,
and the requests are analogous to races. Notice that this mechanism completely
solves the free riding problem that originally plagued P2P systems like Gnutella
and that in milder forms still appears in other such systems.
We then analyze the performance of such a system by making a set of as-
sumptions that are first restrictive but are then relaxed so as to make the system
respond to a realistic crowd. We show that in all these cases there exists an
equilibrium in which the demand for any file can be fulfilled by the system.
Moreover this equilibrium is known to exhibit a robust empirical anomaly, that
of the favorite-longshot bias, which in our case will generate a very long tail in
the distribution of offerings. We finally discussed the scenario where most of
the servers are bounded rational and showed that it is still possible to achieve
an optimum equilibrium if a few servers can act rationally.
The implementation of mechanism is completely feasible with present tech-
nologies. The implementation of a prototype will also help study the behavior
of both providers and users within the context of this parimutuel market. Given
its feasibility, and with the addition of DRM and a payment system, it offers an
interesting opportunity for the provision of legal content with a simple pricing
structure that ensures that unusual content will always be available along with
the more traditional fare.
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